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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\"ICI-\T~~

.T. PIERCE,
J>[aintiff'-Rcspoudeut.

-vs.-

1
(

Ul·~<)lHtE ~\X~\GN"<)frrAKIH,

<lse

N"o. 10081

<lha 'rhe Hhnh and Shah, Ine.,
Defendant -.A.p }Jell ant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
ST1\TE~lENT

OF THE CASE

Thi~ i~

an artion for minimum 'Yages under Section
:~4-4-9 lT C~ \, l~l3~~' as established by regulation of the
Industrial Commission and for the Yalue of meals not
fnrni~lH.\tl hy the employer under the regulation.

DISPOSITIOX IX THE LOWER COURT
The ea~e "·ns tried in part to a jury and in part to
the Court. The Special \.,. erdict of the jury found the
number of hours "-orked by the plaintiff and the value
of meal~ not furnished by the defendants and against
the defendant~ on their affirmatiYe defenses. The Court

1
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held the defense of in. pari delicto was not sufficiently established to be submitted to the jury. The Court entered
judgment for the plaintiff.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment on the defense of in pari delicto, a modification of
the Judgment in the matter of meals furnished and a
ne'v trial for error of the Court in ruling on evidence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff worked for the defendant from New Year's
Eve, 1960 to June 17, 1961, as a waitress at a supper
club known as The Shah in Salt Lake City, Utah. The
Shah was a tavern licensed to sell beer in which food
service was rendered and meals served by Johnny Quong
as a separate operation from the defendant's. By stipulation, the action against the corporation The Shah was
merged with the action against the defendant Anagnostakis individually. (Tr. 349-350)
The defendant defended on the grounds that the
plaintiff was in pari delicto in any violation of the minimum wage law of the State of Utah which is Section
34-4-9 UCA, 1953; that the cause of action was compromised and settled by a release in writing which was
Exhibit D4; that no cause of action lay for meals not
furnished except upon a. showing that they were paid for
by the plaintiff who 'Yas entitled only to reimbursement;
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nnd <'rrtain counter-claims were urged against the
plaintiff.
'fhc Pvidence at the trial was extensive, most of
\vhich \\·ent to the issues of hours worked and the alleged releast' resolved by the jury against the defendant.
~~vitlenre material to the appeal of the defendants includes the following:
Exhibit 1 is a regulation issued for minimum wages
for \vomen which includes in Article 9 a provision that

an intPr,·al of not less than 30 minutes and not longer
than one hour may be allowed for each regular meal
period during a shift and that ''in the restaurant occupation, one substantial meal per shift must be furnished
hy the employer at no cost to the employee."

PLA.l1YTIFF JTICKI PIERCE:
Plaintiff worked for the defendant from New Year's
Eve 1960 until June 17, 1961. (Tr. 71, L. 17-21)
The serYice of food did not start for about six weeks
after the opening. ( Tr. 70, L. 46)
Plaintiff helped serve food when it really got busysuch things as coffee, butter and cream. ( Tr. 73, L. 28-29)
A.fter the food service started, plaintiff worked from
~ix in the evening until one-thirty. (Tr. 74, L.l-7)
Before the food concession opened as a supper club,
the defendant furnished no meals to the plaintiff. (Tr.
3
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77, L. 6-8) When the plaintiff \vorked the late shift, she
had already had dinner but when she came earlier, she
would bring a sandwich and have a. sandwich and cokP.
(Tr. 77, L. 10-14)
The defendant told plaintiff before she \vas hired
that all kinds of food would be served and she would
have a chance to eat. The food \\"'as available but employees were required to pay half price if they wanted
to eat. (Tr. 77, L. 20-30)
The only thing plaintiff ever ate was a steak ~anthYich
\vhich cost her a dollar. (Tr. 78, L. 3-5) She was not reimbursed for the money she spent for meals. (Tr. 78,
L. 13-14)
Defendant objected to testimony about shifts worked
for the reason that she testified she brought sandwiches
on some days and on some days she purchased a meal
and the only evidence rna terial to the issue would be days
on which a meal was purchased. (Tr. 95, L. 24-28)
The testimony then given included all long-shift
days worked without any specification of whether the
plaintiff brought sandwiches, ate other food without
charge, chose to eat no meals, or ate meals for w·hich she
paid. (Tr. 96)
No record was made and agreed on by plaintiff and
defendant as to the number of hours \vorked. (Tr. 10;),
L. 22-27)
Plaintiff never asked defendant for \vages. (Tr. 102,
4
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L. lfi :;o u nd 1o:~. I.J. 1-2)

l.,lnintiff objected to evidence as to the amount of tips
mntle hy t h(' plaintiff and the court ruled ''it has a bearing 011 thl' \·eracity; I cannot admit part without all, even
thott!!h \\·e hnvP no issue on the amount of tips.'' (Tr. 104,
L. H-10) Plaintiff never discussed with defendant the
number of hours "·orked and for \vhich she claims to be
en tit It'Ll to "·ages. ( Tr. 110, L. 19-30; Tr. 111, L. 1-5)
The food at the Shah "·as supplied by Johnny
(~uong. The kitchen \Vas operated separately from the
hnr. (Tr. 114, L. 3-19) Plaintiff had no record of the
numher of meals purchased or the number of sandwiches
:-\hP brought. (Tr. 114, L. 27-30; 115 L. 1-9)
~\ fter

the kitrhen \Yas opened, defendant told plaintiff the best he could do was to arrange with Johnny
Quong for the girls to have meals at half price. Plaintiff made no different request of defendant. (Tr. 115,
L. 19-30: Tr. 116, L. 1-14)
I.~ot~ of times plaintiff didn't have time to eat. Some-

times "·hen she \vas hungry, she asked the cook for something- he had left and ate it between \vaiting on tables.
(Tr. 116, L. 20-30) \Yhic.h she did frequently. (Tr. 117,
L. ~-3) By not stopping to eat, plaintiff's tips were not
interrupted. ( Tr. 117, L. 4-7)
Plaintiff objected to references to tips on the ground
that it \vas impeaching the \vitness on a collateral matter
"·hieh the Court oYer-ruled. (Tr. 118, L. 21-29)
5
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DELANE McBRIDE, Food Waitress:
Food waitresses served food to the cocktail waitresses at half price. ( Tr. 124, L. 27-30) After the staff
got acquainted, if there was food left over, the cocktail
waitresses went into the kitchen and ate food that was
left over. ( Tr. 125, L. 9-22)
Defendants moved to dismiss at the end of plaintiff's
case on the ground that a tavern was not covered by the
restaurant regulation where the tavern was not serving
food and as to the item of meals for the reason that there
'vas no evidence that plaintiff demanded any meals and
no evidence to support recovery for the meals purchased
by the plaintiff for which she was entitled to reimbursement, on the ground that plaintiff should not be allowed
to recover for meals not eaten at her own choice. (Tr.128)
The last day she worked ""as one of the few days
Jim Pappas saw plaintiff take a drink on the job (Tr.
127, L. 4-6}

SAMUEL D. OAKDEN:
The bartender Oakden saw the plaintiff eating or
nibbling in the kitchen and eating sandwiches and kne'v
no way of determining the number of times she ordered
food that was served to her. (Tr. 163, L. 23-30 ~ 190, L.
9-15)
Oakden testified that the plaintiff said ''she would
rather be paid by tips, and that ,,. ay there 'vouldn 't be
6
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any I nt Prnal Revenue on her or anybody else.'' This
stat(.lment \vas stricken hy the Court. (Tr. 161 L. 8-13)
()akd(.ln later testified "~ith reference to the Internal Revpnue and the statement of the plaintiff that she didn't
\rnnt any trouble with the Internal Revenue and that is
why shP "·as signing the release, objection to which by
the plaintiff \vas over-ruled. (Tr. 183, 184, L. 1-15)
Oakden denied that he had made a telephone call to
the plaintiff at Tooele the night before. (Tr. 207, L. 5-16)
The Court instructed the jury that some matters
w·ould he put on without the presence of the jury to determine "·hether the Court's ruling was right. Tr. 209,
I~. 1-7)
/)EFE ..VDANT ANAGNOSTAKIS (GEORGE AGGIE):

Operation of The Shah was defendant's first venture in a night club. (Tr. 212, L. 22-26)
Defendant told the plaintiff before hiring her that
he ''"a~ considering a salary basis that would be fair to
both management and employee and plaintiff "emphatically told me she did not "rant to work for a salary, because she knows "?hat a cocktail waitress can make in a
night club, particularly a new one. Furthermore, it was
muc.h easier, she said as far as income tax 'vas concerned, to work for tips. She did not want to work for
a salary. I told her, had a salary been arranged, no tipping 'vould be allowed in my establishment. Mrs. Pierce
told me she did not want to work for a salary." (Tr. 213,
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L. 13-30). This was objected and sustained as not Involving a jury problem. (Tr. 214, L. 7-8)
There was no set time when the girls could eat or
could not eat. ( Tr. 222-223) When business 'vas good,
plaintiff worked hard and when it slacked off, she 'vould
spend time in a booth chatting 'Yith the girls. (Tr. 223,
L. 11-30) There was time to eat if they wanted to and
no reduction was made for time of eating in the defendant's calculation. ( Tr. 224, L. 2-13)
Under the defendant's employment plan, if a girl \\Tas
eating she was not earning because she couldn't earn tips
and this was left to the girls. (Tr. 224, L. 16-30)
The girls could have all the beverages they wanted
including beer without charge. The drinking of beer was
highly abused. (Tr. 226, L. 8-21) After the girls got
acquainted with the kitchen help, they got free food and
'vere never charged unless they sat down in the evening
and ordered a steak. (Tr. 226, L. 227, L. 26)
The menu of the Don Carlos Ba.r-be-que near the
Shah 'vas refused in evidence although the prices on it
were the same as they had been in 1961. ( Tr. 235 and
236). Defendant testified that if the girls had asked him
to reimburse them for meals purchased, he might haYe
done so. (Tr. 275, L. 27-29) (Tr. 276, L. 5-11).

PLAINTIFF VICKI PIERCE:
Plaintiff's testimony that she did not drink beer or
intoxicating beverages was allowed to stand OYPr defend-

8
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nnt 's ohjection it \\·a~ not proper re-direct. (Tr. 2D.l,
L.

1~-17)

Plaintiff'~ mother, .i\lrs. Baker, was allowed to tes-

ti t'y to a telephone call received by her in Tooele the night
hPfore hl'l' tP~timony, ovPr objection that it \Yas hearsay
and thn t it \ras not connected in any \ray with anybody in
the action, in 'rhich said 'ritness stated that the man on
the telephone said ''Vickie, this is Sam Oakden. I \rant to
talk to you about your testimony." (Tr. 301)

Plaintiff also testified that Jim Pappas told her he
\vould lie on the witness stand (Tr. 309) which was denied hy ~I r. Pappas. (Tr. 151 L. 1-3)
Plaintiff testified on direct examination that she
(lrinks one cup of coffee in the morning, "not as a habit"
and ~~I don't drink beer'' and doesn't drink alcoholic beverages. (rrr. 319, L. 16-23)
Plaintiff did not complain about the food. (Tr. 335,
L. 7) She asked defendant once about a meal and def~ndan t ans\Yered she ''""as welcome to coffee or tea but if
she \Yanted a meal, ''The best 've could do would be half
price'' and she had no further conversation with defend\lllt about it. (L. 11-20)
Pia in tiff testified that she did not drink in 1961 and
dnPs not no\v drink alcoholic beverages and did not drink
"·ith customers "~hile at the Shah. (Tr. 336) Plaintiff
denied drinking alcoholic beverages on the day she quit.
(Tr. 337, L. 16-19) And she then testified, "I don't
drink - I don't drink.'' (Line 26)
9
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DEFENDENT AGGIE:

The gir Is were encouraged to eat left-overs in the
kitchen. (Tr. 339, L. 13-17)
The Court sustained an objection to efforts of the
defendant to discredit the testimony of Mrs. Pierce by
showing that she drinks. ( Tr. 346, L. 9-21)
George Aggie testified that he loaned plaintiff $100.00
for a trip to Las Vegas. (Tr. 239) Jim Pappas testified
that he loaned her $250.00 of which $50.00 was paid back.
(Tr. 134) (151-152) The making of these loans was denied by the plaintiff. (As to George Aggie's loan see
transcript 83 L. 26, transcript 310, L. 24-28, transcript 320231 and as to the Pappas loan, transcript 307 and 310.)
Defendant testified that these loans were forgiven
in connection with the execution of the release, Exhibit
D4. (Tr. 244)
At the trial after the verdict of the jury and outside
the presence of the jury, the following matters \\~ere testified to:
ROBERT J. SHAUGHNESSY:
The plaintiff filed several claims with the Industrial
Commission for 'vages against a safe-driving club,
against Mike Archulletta, a restaurant operator, for
wages, neither of which involved minimum 'vages, and
against Ed Green of Provo, Utah, on December 19, 1961.
( Tr. 370-371)
10
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Plaintiff produced her income tax return for 1961
,vhich shows no income from The Shah. Her testimony
\vns thnt her income at The Shah was around $900.00.
(Tr. :l7;), l1. 14-18 and 30)
()nly part of her tip money was deposited in her bank
account. (Tr. 376, L. 2-7)

'rhe Court ruled that to support the defense of pa.Ti
dt~licfo ""ould "imply a conspiracy, or agreement bet,veen them to cheat the Government,'' and that testimony about it being in the mind of one person 'vas not
sufficient. This would be true even if the plaintiff knew
there \Yas n minimum wage and she could not lawfully be
required to 'vork for tips only. (Tr. 379, 380) The offer
of further testimony on the subject was denied on the
ground that there was already enough in the record for
the Supreme Court. ( Tr. 381, L. 24-29)

Before working at The Shah, plaintiff worked at the
Esquire Lounge for $1.00 an hour where she tended bar
on Friday and Saturday and on other nights. They guaranteed $5.00 a night and if she didn't make $5.00 in tips,
they would make it up. ( Tr. 383, L. 3-20) If she didn't
make $5.00 in tips, the Esquire made it up. ( Tr. 384,
L. 1-6)
She worked at the Starlight Club in 1960 and for the
.American Legion Post. (Tr. 384) At one of these places
she was guaranteed $10.00 a night. (Tr. 385) At Post
11
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133 she worked for $1.00. (Tr. 385, L. 24-28) She worked
for Leonard and Ross Feraco for $1.00 an hour. (Tr.
386, L. 1-3)
She worked at the Purple Garter before going to
The Sh~h for $1.00 an hour and had to go to the Industrial Commission to get it. (Tr. 386, L. 10-17)
She operated the kitchen in the Drifter's Club in
Park City the last three months of 1960. (Tr. 387, L.
11-12)

sa\v
4-9)
"\Vas
en.

Before coming to Utah, she worked in California and
the minimum wage law posted there. (Tr. 390, L.
Her mother had owned a bar in California and she
aware that there were minimum wage laws for wom( Tr. 390, L. 17-29)

When she went to work at the Esquire, the manager
talked to her about the hourly wage and about the guarantee of $5.00 a night. (Tr. 391, L. 7-24)
Before going to work at The Shah, she had talked to
l\Irs. .Jiaas at the Industrial Commission and learned
""hat her rights were. (Tr. 393, L. 20-23)

DEFENDANT AGGIE:

Defendant testified that \Yhen he employed the plaintiff she stated that she didn't \Yant to \York for salary,
''she preferred working for tips, because she kne\v \vhat

12
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a .~irl <'onld make as a cocktail 'vaitrPss by 'vorking for
tips.·' liP rrlied on her preference in establishing the
polit·y nt rrht' Shah and if he had kno"rn of the minimum
wage Ia ,,., he believes he "·ould have made his compensation basis different than he did. (Tr. 396, L. 11-28)
.After learning of the minimum 'vage la'v on Au~nst 17, 1961, defendant established the policy of paying the girls $1.00 an hour and letting them keep their
tips. (Tr. 397, L. 4-18) He first learned of the minimum
\\·age Ia\\· and its application to The Shah in August, 1961.
(Tr.

:~n7,

L. 23-25).

Jlrior to his opening The Shah, he talked to the managers of several taverns and learned that none of them
\ras paying a minimum wage. A lot of them 'vere paying
a guarauteP. (Tr. 398, L. 1-9)

POINTS RELIED ON
1. The defense of iu pari delicto should have been
~nhmitted to the jury.
~. The holding of the Court and the Instructions to

thP jury on the matter of furnishing meals "rere erroneous.
;). Exclusion of evidence of plaintiff's drinking ,vas
erroneous and prejudicial.

''"a~

-!. ..:\ purported telephone statement of Sam Oakden
erroneously admitted.

13
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DEFENSE OF IN PARI DELICTO SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUB~IITTED
TO THE JURY.
The Court ruled that there 'vould have to be eYIdence of conspiracy or agreement to cheat the Government and that kno"\\ring of a violation by the plaintiff
was insufficient.
Plaintiff's mother had operated a tavern in California where plaintiff learned there "ras a minimum w·age
law. (Tr. 390) Plaintiff had worked at the Esquirr
Lounge, the Starlight Club, the American Legion Post,
for Leonard and Ross Ferraco and at the Purple Garter
before going to "\\rork at The Shah. Tr. 383-386) She had
also operated the kitchen in the Drifter's Club in Park
City before coming to The Shah. (Tr. 387) At the Esquire and at the Starlight Club, she had "rorked for tips
"·ith a minimum guarantee. ( Tr. 383-385)
Before "rorking at The Shah, plaintiff had talked to
the Industrial Commission about her rights (Tr. 393) aud
had filed several claims "\Yith the Industrial l:ommission
for "rages. (Tr. 370-371)
The evidence of the defendant "\vas that this 'vas hi~
first venture in the night club business (Tr. :212) and that
he did not knO"\\" that the minimum "\Yage la 'Y applied in
taverns (Tr. 396) as the taverns he kne"\v of 'vere paying
tips onl~r to "\Yaitresses (Tr. 398) As soon as he learned
that the Industrial Commission claimed The Shah "\ra~
14
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subject to the minimum \vage law, he established minimum \rages plus tips for his employees. (Tr. 397)
l\t the time of employing the plaintiff, defendant was

unret1ain \vhether to pay a substantial wage or to let the
girl~ \vork for tips only. (Tr. 213) The plaintiff was definitP that she \vanted tips only as it was a new place and
she knew what she could make. (Tr. 213 and 296) She
also preferred tips only as that enabled her to handle
h(lr internal revenue problems more satisfactorily. (Tr.
~13, 161 and 379) And, in fact, she reported no income
from The Shah on her 1961 tax return. ( Tr. 37 5)
Defendant's theory of in pari delicto, therefore, ineluded evidence that the plaintiff knew of the minimum
\vage Ia"· and made the decision that the employment
~hould be for tips only, that she would make more money
that 'vay and "·ould be able to conceal her income from
the Internal Revenue Service.
Defendant admits that ordinarily an employee "\Yho
\Vorks knowingly for less than the minimum wage may
maintain an action for the minimum wage under Section
34-4-17. But defendant contends that where the employee
makes the decision to \Vork for tips because she will make
more money that 'vay, the employer gives her a choice
and the employer does not know that he is violating the
minimum wage law, the employee is precluded from maintaining t be action under the doctrine of in pari delicto.
Furthermore, the plaintiff's intent to cheat on inrome taxes ·with the acquiescence of the employer also
~upports the defense of in pari delicto.
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In an early Utah case, the defense of in pari rlerir·fo
,,~as applied against an employee \Yho brought an action
for overtime wages and it appeared that both plaintiff
and defendant kne\\~ of the violation. Short Y. I/ulliouBeck a1zd Chrnnpion llfining Compa.ny, 20 Utah 20, 57 Pac.
720. Also, \Yhere the parties agreed to keep a false record
of time "~orked knowing that it \Yas in Yiolation of the
minimum \Yage la,v, an action hy the employee "~as denied
because he was in pari delicto. Leu~is v. Ff'rrari (Calif.,
1939), 90 P. 2d 284. This California case \Yas distinguished
in Bartholo1new v. Ha.ymen Properties (Calif., 1933 ), 281
Pac. 2d 921 at 925, \vhere the employer had required that
the excessive \vork be done and the Court held that the
employ<'c had the remedy.
There may be cases ''"~here both parties are in d('l i ct o, concurring in an illegal act" but \Y here the~~ are not
u in pari delicto." "One party may act under circumstances of opposition, oppression, hardship, undue influence, or great inequality of condition or age, so that
his guilt may be far less in degree than that of his associates in the offense.'' Rozell v. TT ansyckle, 11 \Vash. 7!1.
39 P. 270 at 272. The defense applies "There the parties
are in equal guilt or "~here the guilt of the defendant is
less. T. . an .J..fnhcerp v. l7 au ..:int1cerp, 3 Southern ~<1 7!1,
242 Ala. 92; il!cGltee 's ..._-ldnzinistrator v. Elcornb Coal
Con1pany, 288 Kent. 540,156 S.\V. 2d 868 at 869~ Byers Y.
Byers, 223 N.C. 83, 23 S.E. 2d 466 at 470.
The defense of in }Jari delicto \Vas held to defeat two
actions L~T the plaintiff under the 0. P . .1\. regulation~ of
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prit•t•H nnd l'Pllt.

}"oung v. Jrierenga 314 ~lich. 287, 23

~\V ~tl ~}~;

Tu·i(11aus v. Rosner (.~lo. 1952) 245 S.W.
:!d l 07, :!H .A .L.R. 2d 1192.

The Pvidence plainly sho,vs that an important factor
in the dPeision of plaintiff 'vas to enable her to 'vithhold
in format ion from taxing authorities which is an obvious
illegality. rrhis purpose of the contract that "'"aS made
wns oll\·ions from the testimony of the defendant and
~am ()akden and from the complete failure of the plaintiff to report income from The Shah on her tax return,
is, therefore sufficient to defeat the claim of the plaintiff.
HPe 17 (l. J. 8. (}ontracts, Section 293 c. This principle
has been applied "·here plaintiff sought to recover rent
on a house \rhich was used for an unlawful purpose
(Dougherf.IJ v. Seymour, 16 Colo. 289, 26 P. 8 23; Ernst v.
Crosley, (C~t. 1\pp. N.Y. 1893) 35 N. E. 603) and under a.
rontract to furnish refreshments a.t a racing meet where
the ulterior purpose was to attract people and promote
gambling. (8t. Louis Fair Association v. Carmody, 151
~ro . .)(), .>~ S.vV. 365, 74 Am. S. R. 571). Illegality was
allo,ved as a defense "·here the seller knew or should have
know·n that the liquor being sold would be unlawfully resold in another state. Graves v. Johnson (:~lass. 1892),
:10 X.E. 818. .A. plaintiff cannot force sale of merchandise
to be shipped in Yiolation of a presidential proclamation
"·here he kne'v or should have known it would be in\"Olved in such an infraction. Takahashi v. Pepper Tank &
C'(lllfracfing Co. (''Tyo. 1942), 131 P. 2d 339.
Ho,v much defendant kne'v of the minimum wage la'"{··,
ho,\· much plaintiff knew of the la"'", and the motives of
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plaintiff in making the election that she did make for the
purposes about which there was testimony raised an issue
under the defense of in. pari delicto which should have
been submitted to the jury in some form. Defendant'~
requests 1 and 2 were reasonable to submit this issue. (Tr.
39-40) No request \Yas submitted on the matter of the
Internal Revenue because it was not known until after
the jury verdict that plaintiff had not reported inrome
from The Shah on her ta.x return. (Tr. 379-381)

POINT II. THE HOLDING OF THE COURT
AND THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
ON THE l\1ATTER OF FlTRNISHING
l\iEALS WERE ERRONEOUS.
The evidence \vas that the plaintiff sometimes
brought sandwiches (Tr. 77), sometimes ate food given
to her by the kitchen (Tr. 116, 117, 125, 226 and 339),
sometimes w'as too busy earning tips to stop for meals
(Tr. 116, 223), sometimes just had a drink (Tr. ~26) and
never ordered and paid for anything except a steak sand,,,.ich ( Tr. 78). The plaintiff never complained of this condition ( Tr. 115, 116 and 335) and stands before the Court
as a person \Yho got along very \Yell on the food and
drink that \Yere supplied to her, giving no indication of
dissatisfaction or of an interest in demanding the supplying of a different or more substantial meal under the
regulation or other,vise, "'"ho suffered no ill effects from
the \Yay she ate, and gave no evidence that she \Yas not
compJetely satisfied \Yith the food and beverage arrangements at The Shah. For the steak sand"\\riches that she
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att•, she kept no record and made no specific demand for

reimhu rsement.
'fhe regulation does not provide a remedy and it is
presumably a health and welfare standard which employers should observe, similar to the rest period. An
employer commits a crime if he does not observe the
health standards. Also, a violator would be subject to
act ion hy the Industrial Commission to compel compliance 'vith the regulation, or by the employee if the employt•P \Vished to take a stand. There is no suggestion in
the regulation or the statute that an employee can eat
food from the kitchen or bring her own sandwiches or
he ~ntisfied \\'"ith a drink or a couple of drinks, keeping
no records of happenings and then bring an action for
the cost of a substantial meal for the entire period of
Pmployment.
On this state of the evidence and the law, defendant
mo\'"ed to dismiss as to this aspect of the case at the close
of plaintiff's evidence (Tr. 128) which motion should
have been granted.
The Court gaYe no instruction under which the jury
could have determined the number of meals purchased
hy the plaintiff for "'"hich she was entitled to reimbursement, or the value of sandwiches which she had supplied
herself. or any measure under which the food supplied
free of charge by the kitchen at The Shah fell short of a
· · sub~tantial meal." The Special Verdict simply asked
the jury to fix the value of the meal, "'"hich was cost to
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the defendant of one-half the menu price and \vhich
fixed at 75r. (Tr. 45)

\ra~

Defendant objected to the failure of the Court to instruct the jury on the intermediate position resulting
from the furnishing of some food by the defendant and
the value of the sand\viches supplied by the plaintiff hPrself. (Tr. 352) Requested Instructions No. 6 ancl 7, {Tr.
43 and 44) are directed to the same error and should haYe
been given.
There \Yas further error against the defendant in the
matter of mealtime and meals. l\Iaking her calculation of
hours on Exhibit 3 and in her testimony (Tr. 94) thr
plaintiff made no deduction for mealtime in calculatingthe time \vorkecl. The defendant also testified that hi~
calculation of hours \Yas not reduced by allowance for
mealtime (Tr. 224), but at the same place defendant tc~
tified that girls took time for meals whenever they wanted
to and up to an hour. The only instruction to the jury on
this matter vras 9.A (Tr. 21) \vhich took no cognizance of
the fact that if the plaintiff \Yere allo\ved to recover the
value of a meal not furnished, she could not at the same
time be paid for the time of the meal, some of \Yhirh
\Vere taken and some ""ere not. Defendant objected to
the failure to give an instruction \Yhich \vould cure thi~
defect and do equity. (Tr. 352, I~. 19-~-!)
Such a provision is presumahl:~ a common one as it
appears to be reasonable. There must be decided eases
"~hich ""ould be precedents or of interest to the Court hut
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unahlc to find them. ~\ comparable issue
nro~t' on arbitration \vhere culinary "·orkers \Vere eating
t'ood for \rhieh the hospital sought to charge them. Under
a rule similar to the one here, it \\·as held that the meals
~honld he furnishrd to the culinary workers by the employPr at no additional cost and an allowance made where
n meal ,,·as not aYailable \vith no determination of \\"hat
rem(ldy the employees might have had for the past meals
not furnished or furnished and deducted from pay. 1 n
n· San f raucisco H aspital Conference and Hospital
('tJufcr('IU.'(' and Hospital Workers Local No. 250 (A.F.L.)
.-> I . abor . .\rbitration Reports p. 137, (1946).

wP have

ht'Pll

1

The employee \vishing to obtain compensation for
mPals purchased by her undoubtedly would and should
be required to keep a record of such meals so that reimbursement \Vould be completed and accurate. And if such
an employee brought her own food from home, a record
should be kept and proven on that and \Vith testimony
as to the value of it for purposes of reimbursement.
l)n the other hand, girls are not compelled to eat

heavy meals and if the plaintiff preferred to have a bevera~e or a snack from the kitchen either with or without
taking time off for the eating of it, she has made an election w·hich she has a. right to make and cannot no'v hold
the employer for the cost of food in addition to the food
"·hirh she ate or the cost of food \\"hich she intentionally
turned do""n for the sake of her figure or \\"eight control
or for any other reason. There \Yas no complaint in the
record that the plaintiff worked too hard and did not
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have opportunity to rest and under the instructions giYtln
and the testimony of the parties and the form of the special verdict, the plaintiff has already been compensated
for all of her mealtime regardless of who supplied or paid
for the food.
The amount of money involved in this portion of the
Judgment (110 x 75c (Tr. 45) or a total of $82.50) represents only part of the mischief. rrhe trial of the case and
the instructions to the jury were favorable to the plaintiff
and unfair to the defendant. For this reason the Court
should remand the case for a ne'v trial. And in any Pvent,
the verdict should be reduced by $82.50.
POINT III. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OF
PLAINTIFF'S DRINKING WAS ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL.
Whether or not plaintiff drank beer and liquor \vcre
given significance in the eyes of the jury by reason of
emphasis of the subject. Defendant testified that the
drinking of beer by the girls was without charge and also
that this "w·as highly abused." (Tr. 226) The plaintiff
\\!as then called for cross-examination ( Tr. 283) and on
re-exa.mina tion by the plaintiff \Yas allowed to testify
that she did not drink beer or intoxicating beverages to
\vhich defendant objected as not proper re-direct but
\vhich objection was overruled. (Tr. 294, L. 21-17). Plaintiff again testified on direct examination that she drinks
one cup of coffee in the morning "not as a habit" and "I
don't drink beer'' and does not drink alcoholic beverages.
( Tr. 319).
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Jim Pappas had testified that the last day the plaintiff \rorkec 1 was one of the few days he saw her take a
clrink on the job. (Tr. 137} Plaintiff further testified
that she did not drink in 1961 and does not now drink alcoholic beverages and did not drink with customers while
at The Shah, denied drinking alcoholic beverages on the
rluy she quit and finally testified "I don't drink - I
don't drink.'' ( Tr. 336 and 337)
Defendant made plain that his purpose in going into
the tnatter of drinking was to discredit the testimony of
t ht' plaintiff. ( Tr. 346, L. 9-21) And he was refused his
right.
This was contrary to the earlier ruling of the Court
"·here plaintiff objected to evidence of the amount of tips
made by the plaintiff and the Court ruled ''it has a bearing on the veracity; I cannot admit part without all,
even though '"'e have no issue on the amount of tips.''
(Tr. 104) The Court made a similar ruling again at
Tr. 118.
The Court gave Instruction No. 13 on impeachment
Tr. 24) but had refused opportunity to the defendant to
contradict the plaintiff on a subject of considerable and
repeated testimony .
..:\. ppellant recognizes that there are definite limitations on the right to impeach or contradict a witness, including a party, as to collateral matters. This is especially true ""here the subject matter was brought out on
cross-examination by the party who then desires to introduce contradictory testimony. That was the situation
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in State Y. Steadman, 70 Utah 224, 259 P. 326 \\'here thi~
Court held evidence inadmissible for impenchment on a
collateral matter.
The rule has been different "·here the immatt·rial
testimony as to ·w·hich impeachment is sought \\·as offered
by the party as part of his own case. State v. AC.., pralJIU',
135 I\Ie. 470, 199 A. 703; State v. Fletcher, 210 La. 409,
27 So. 2d 179; T'erritory of Hawaii v. Izznni, 34 Ha"··
209. And that is the situation here.
1

Furthermore, appellant objected to testimony about
drinking as not proper direct testimony, after appellant
had called the plaintiff for cross-examination. (Tr. 294)
Also, the prior inconsistent rulings of the Court that he
'vould let immaterial matter in for issues of veracity (Tr.
104 and 118) should have been follo\\.,.ed 'vhen the appellant sought to elicit contradictory testimony on the subject of plaintiff's drinking. It 'vas this combination of
circumstances which, appellant submits, made the exclusion prejudicial error.
POI~T I\T. A
STATE~IENT

RONEOUSL }~

PURPORTED TELEPHONE
OF SAl\f OAKDEN \\T AS ERAD~IITTED.

On the second day of the trial, Sam Oakden, the bartender, \\~as asked if he made a telephone call to I\Irs.
Pierce at Tooele the night before. He testified he did
uot. He further te~tified that he kne,,· nothing about
such n call. (Tr. 207)
The plaintiff 'vas then asked about thi~ phone call
and she testified onl~~ to a message from a nine-year-old
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(·hild that she \Vns ",.anted on the phone by someone
IuUnPd Sam, '"hie h phone call she did not accept. ( Tr.
:,!~):t) rrhe plaintiff then attempted to go into the conver:-\Utioll hPt\\'PPll the plaintiff and her mother to \Yhich objPetiou \vas made and the subject abandoned. (Tr. 294,
L. 7-9)
'rhereaftPr, the plaintiff called her mother to testify
<'oll<'Prning this phone call to \vhich objection \vas made
8:-\ hPing- immaterial and not proper rebuttal, as being
lu•ar~ny and as being "not connected in any \Yay \vith
nuybody in this action.'' The \vitness was allowed to
h·~tify that she answered the phone and said hello that
''a man ans\vered and said, 'Vicki, this is Sam Oakden.
I \Vant to talk to you about your testimony.' " (Tr.
:alO-:HH ).
This ttlstimony was prejudicial to the defendant because it accused the defendant of attempting to control
thP evidence and because the witness Jim Pappas had
already been accused of stating to the plaintiff that he
intended to lie on the "Ti tness stand ( Tr. 309) \Vhich the
\vitnP~s Pappas had denied. (Tr. 151)
Telephone conYersations may be admissible under
certain circumstances but only where the identity of the
person 'vith \Yhom the " . itness spoke or \vhom he heard
~peak i~ satisfactorily established. 20 Am. Jur. Erid ence
'
'
Spetion~ 365 and 366. Proof of identity n1ay not be
found alone from the statement of his identity by the party
railing on the telephone. Op. Cit. Section 368. To the
~arne effect, are the annotations at 105 ALR 326 at 335
and 71 .A.LR 3 at 41. The only Utah case cited in the sup-
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plemental annotations is State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d
230, 238, 240 ; 282 P. 2d 323, 328-330, 'vhere a. telephone
conversation reportedly made by a defendant to a. third
party 'Yas held to be hearsay and the prejudicial effect
of it was considered by this Court.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Whether plaintiff was in pari delicto in a minimum
\\'"age law violation and in a practice designed to conceal
income from the taxing authority should ha.Ye been suhmitted to the jury. There V\'"as prejudicial error in admitting plaintiff's testimony about drinking by plaintiff
and then refusing to permit contradictory evidence on
this much emphasized subject.
It was also prejudicial to permit plaintiff's mother
to testify to a telephone call from an unidentified person
t hereb~,. accusing defendant of attempting to control the
evidence.
For these errors defendant should have a ne'Y trial.
The errors w'ith reference to meals also require a
new trial to determine the correct allo"'"ance to the plaintiff; unless her acquiescence 'Yas a 'vaiver, in ",.hich event
there should be a reduction in the verdict of $82.50.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, BIRD ~\XD HART
716 N e\vhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorueys for .Appellant
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